Sunday, May 24, 2015

9.6 Research: Human Factors, Ethics and Morality

The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in war has multiple advantages most notably with the reduction in causalities for the user.  This advantage was further increased with the added ability to target and engage upon enemy combatants by remote means, further removing the potential for friendly causalities.  However at the same time, this new capability had also changed the face of war creating a “risk-free enterprise” or a sensation as if equal to that of playing a video game (Johansson, 2011).   Currently the military requires by regulations that humans must be involved in the decision making when engaging in lethal force.  However this regulation may change in the future as more advanced artificial intelligence software makes finding, identifying, confirming and even engaging upon “lethal combatants without human intervention possible.  This is what I like to refer to as the Terminator effect.  This once seemed as a far-fetched science fiction movie is now becoming a potential for future warfare, with machines killing discriminately.  But even the current method presents a moral, ethical and unique human factors associated with the use of UAVs as a weapon in conflicts.

Morally we understand that life should only be taken as a last resort as a means of resolving conflict during a state war. Morality however has become more obscured with the use of UAVs, especially when involving lethal force.  This is because the users of UAVs are no longer located in the same area as the targets they are engaged with and therefore are removed from the mental and physical effects normally associated with war in person.   This creates an environment in which the decision for lethal force becomes easy, as those pushing the button are removed from the horror of their action.  This also raises the question, to whether the operators of UAVs are considered lethal combatants of ware given their involvement, despite being removed from the battle field.  The U.S. Department of Defense officials along with most legal scholars agree that operators are legal combatants, whether on or off-duty (Majumdar, 2001).  Of course this presents another factor as most operators are conducting these operations within the borders of the US.  Therefore any retaliation towards the operators from our enemy would be conducted on US soil, creating an unfair advantage for the operator.  However in retaliation, our enemy has broadened their targets beyond the operators.  Just recently “ISIS has been targeting  military personal and even family of military members within the United States, who are involved with UAS” (Majumdar, 2001).  This again poses the question of whether this is morally right or wrong; keeping in mind that the morality is based upon ones cultural acceptance between what is right versus wrong behavior or actions.  In other words, what we consider wrong in our society is morally acceptable by our enemies. 

The more obvious ethical side of using UAVs is in the terms of what is considered legal warfare.  In our history, war was between two or more nations or states; however today, war has been declared and conducted on ideology with no defined state-hood or boarders.  The lake of statehood alone can be considered a violation of the legitimacy of war (Johansson, 2011).  None the less today, we are conducting UAV operations worldwide and even taking lives that we deem necessary under the presumption of war, while finding it illegal for our enemy to do the same against us (Majumdar, 2001).  This raises the question to what is being conducted by means of UAV worldwide morally or ethically right.  Morally we understand when it is acceptable to take a life; however without defining war to the boundaries of statehood, at what point is the political justification that resulted in war truly fulfilled.  Furthermore, at what point are the lines of war blurred as UAV’s transition between boundaries to conduct operations without a declaration of war since no humans are physically on board.  This even extends to those involved in the execution of the UAV; some of which who are civilian agencies.  This even raises the propensity to conduct operations that may result in the loss in life as the perception of war becoming costless (Johansson, 2011). 

UAVs have their own unique human factors associated with their use, which can exacerbate the decision for lethal force.  UAV pilots are first restricted in their ability to use majority of their five senses; currently restricted to only visual (monitors) and audio (radios).   Therefore UAV pilots have higher degree in proportional use of force errors caused by the restriction of their view and the physical separation from the target, resulting in the greater potential for collateral damage to civilian life (Majumdar, 2001).  Other more common human factors that are more likely to occur with UAVs consist of individual skill and knowledge of their weapon system.  This includes checklist errors, task saturation or mis-prioritization, lack in training, and lack in crew coordination. 
          
            The use of  manned aircraft have been accepted as moral and ethical way to wage war given that the declaration of war against a state or nation is clear.  Although accepted, this can still present a problem.  One justification for the continued development and use of UAVs for strikes is that manned aircraft target accuracy can be inhibited by a pilot’s inclination to “hurry when put in a dangerous area or situation” (Johansson, 2011).  However unlike UAVs the perception a manned aircraft pilot has on the target area and well as the target itself is greater.  Manned aircraft pilots have the ability to use majority if not all their five senses to interpret the situation whereas UAV pilots are restricted to visual interpretation from the monitors in front of them and the audio from the radios only. 

Overall, the future use of UAVs needs to have a more definitive declaration of when authorized for use, similar to those of manned aircraft.  Due to the complexity of viable targets, UAV operations need to understand that just because they are not physically present with the aircraft does not remove them from the list of legal combatant.  Therefore, further examination to whether they should be used for lethal strikes should be reviewed as their continued use poses a greater potential threat for homeland defense as retaliation towards the operators and their relatives increase.  Not to mention the moral and ethical implications with their use for striking targets from within the US boarders.  Additionally, more clear guidance needs to be written on what is considered legal warfare in the regards to UAV operations from beyond line of sight.  This is of particular importance as other nations are developing their own UAVs and looking towards the US as to what is considered as an acceptable use.  Therefore we as a nation have the responsibility to define the future morality in the use of UAVs.  This is why I feel that UAVs should be restricted to reconnaissance use only despite having a human making the decision for lethal force.  That manned aircraft are best reserved for physical strikes as they remove some of the ambiguity of information, and decrease the blur between what is morally right and is ethically accepted by majority of the world for use during war.

Reference

Johansson, L. (2011). Is it morally right to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in war?. Philosophy & technology, 24(3), 279-291. doi: 10.1007/s13347-011-0033-8

Majumdar, D. (2001, May 16). Can remote operators of UAVs become military targets?. Defense News, Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/869002825?accountid=27203


Sunday, May 17, 2015

8.6 Research: UAS Crew Member Selection

The specific needs for the operations of the Insitu Scan Eagle and the General Atomics Ikhana are somewhat different.  Currently both of these systems are military platforms that are being operated worldwide by the Army and the Air Force respectively.  With that, the required crew positions, qualification, certification and training that are currently in use can be used as an outline for this new company which will be referred to as Company-X.  Being that these aircraft are operationally different it is important to separate the requirements.  However for the sake of simplicity I will only discuss the flight element and therefore will not include all supporting elements.

First looking at the General Atomica Ikhana, which is a MQ-9 Predator B modified for use in environmental research and observation.  Outside of system modifications, an increased redundancy in flight systems and improvements is performance the functionality remains the same.  The Air Force utilizes a two crewmember concept for their MQ-9 operations; the pilot and sensor operator (this doesn’t include maintenance, or the ground element teams required for takeoff and landings).  Currently they restrict both the pilots and sensor operators to either Rated Officers which consist of both Pilots or Combat System Operators (CSO) or officers who attended the Undergraduate Remotely Piloted Aircraft Training (URT) which is the direct method of training ("Pilot: Remotely piloted," ).  Currently the AF is not permitted enlisted members to act as pilots and sensor operators due to the complexity of the airspace in which the aircraft would be flying in.  For example, pilots will be required to communicate with air traffic controllers, other airborne assets, as well as be able to understand the complexity involved with flying in a dynamic environment.  For this reason, it is wise to assume that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will require drone pilots to hold the same certificates as a commercial and instrument pilot in manned aircraft (Pew, 2013).  Therefore Company-X should also have operators that hold the same aeronautical certificates.  More than likely the best way to insure these aeronautical certificates is to hire pilots, prior MQ-9 pilots or create a training program that fulfills this.  What is interesting to note is that recent studies are indicating that pilots from manned aircraft who transition to remotely operated vehicles tend to perform worst that those who have only flown remote aircraft (Pew, 2013).   The basic belief for this has to do with the limited physical and visual cue a remote pilot has versus those from manned aircraft.  This is known as a negative transfer.  A good program to model after outside of the military is NASA whom also uses the Ikahana variant (Merlin, 2009).   In either case for non-prior pilots, typical training consist of basic flying fundamentals similar to those given to manned aircraft pilots, followed by MQ-9 operations and regulations in simulations and concludes with hands on practical experience with the aircraft itself (Insinna, 2014).   Each pilot and sensor operator will be required to maintain a Second Class medical clearance as outlined by Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 67 (5b).  Other considerations are the minimum requirements that all candidates for pilot/sensor potions should be held to, starting with clean background for security clearance eligibility (as required), a college degree or specific training in remote operations and finally no permanent disqualifications for aviation services.

Ikhana, summarized:
·         Crew Positions: 
     o   Two crewmember concept; pilot and sensor operator for the flight operations.
§  This does not include any ground personal required for maintenance or ground operations prior and after flight.
·         Qualification, certification and training requirements:
     o   Hold a commercial and instrument pilot equivalent rating.
     o   Basic flight training, system operations using simulators, and hands on practical experience      using the MQ-9 aircraft.
     o   Second Class Medial for commercial applications of a UAS
·         Minimum standards for applicants:
     o   Clean background (for potential security clearance)
     o   Bachelor’s degree or training in remote operations
     o   No permanent disqualifications

The second is the Scan Eagle, which is significantly smaller than the MQ-9 and somewhat less advanced in terms of sensors; however the requirements are somewhat the same.  For starters, the Scan Eagle also consist of two “flying” positions; pilot and sensor operator.  Again this does not include any ground elements.  Yet because the Scan Eagle operational range and altitude is less the pilot requirements can be less than the pilots of the MQ-9.  The Army currently does not have a requirement for “rated” officers only; rather they permit an enlisted member assigned to a specific career field.  This however does not mean there is a change to the qualifications.  Although the Scan Eagle pilots do not attend a formalized pilot training course at the manned pilots, they are required to attend an in-depth 33 weeks course (10-weeks of Basic Combat Training; 23-weeks of advanced individual training) followed by on-the-job instruction ("Unmanned aircraft systems," ).  In regards to Company-X, a similar course to that of the Army can benefit the company.  By not requiring the exact same type of training as the MQ-9, Company-X can reduce the cost not only in the training but also in the cost in operations.  Also like the MQ-9, the training requirements will include currency programs to maintain safety as mandated by the FAA (Mirot, 2013).  The FAA regulations also call for pilots/operators to have a minimum of 3 take off and landings per 90 days (Mirot, 2013).  However the Scan Eagle is unique in that the system utilizes a hydraulic launcher and a “sky” net to capture so the typical takeoff and landing are not in the traditional terms.  None the less this does not negate the requirements but instead only modifies the understanding of what takeoff and landings means.  In terms of medical requirements, the Scan Eagle is only requiring a Second Glass medical certificate as outlined by Title 14 of the CFR, Part 67 (Mirot, 2013).  Finally, like the MQ-9, Company-X will need to have applicants who have a clean background for potential security clearances, and again no permanent disqualifications for remote operations.
Scan Eagle, summarized:
·         Crew Positions: 
     o   Two crewmember concept; pilot and sensor operator for the flight operations.
§  This does not include any ground personal required for maintenance or ground operations prior and after flight.
·         Qualification, certification and training requirements:
     o   Basic flight training, system operations using simulators, and hands on practical experience using the Scan Eagle aircraft.
     o   A second class medial certificate for commercial application of a UAS.
·         Minimum standards for applicants:
     o   Clean background (for potential security clearance)
     o   No permanent disqualifications

Reference

Insinna, V. (2014, December). Predator, reaper crew training at all times high as demand continues. National Defense, Retrieved from http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2014/December/Pages/PredatorReaperCrewTrainingatAllTimeHighAsDemandContinues.aspx

 

Merlin, P. (2009). Ikhana unmanned aircraft system western states fire missions. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Retrieved from http://history.nasa.gov/monograph44.pdf
Mirot, A. (2013). The future of unmanned aircraft systems pilot qualification. Journal of aviation/aerospace education & research, 22(3), 19-30. Retrieved from http://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1317&context=jaaer
Pew, G. (2013, April 26). The drones are coming: Who will fly them?. Retrieved from http://www.avweb.com/news/avtraining/drone_pilot_training_forecast_uas_208586-1.html
Pilot: Remotely piloted aircraft pilot. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://afreserve.com/jobs/officer-positions/pilot/remotely-piloted-aircraft-rpa-pilot


Saturday, May 16, 2015

7.7 - Research: Operational Risk Management

My Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment Tool is for the US Army’s Scan Eagle, Unmanned Aerial System (UAS).  It is a single engine, single wing aircraft that is significantly smaller as compared to the USAF’s RQ-1, RQ-9, and RQ-4 at just less than 5.6 feet long with a wingspan of 10.2 feet ("INSITU: ScanEagle system," 2013).  It weighs in at maximum of 48.5 pounds, cruises at 50 to 60 knots that is capable of endurance greater than 24 hours while operating at altitudes up to 19,500 feet ("INSITU: ScanEagle system," 2013).  What’s unique about this system is its launch and recover systems in which it utilizes a catapult for launch and a sky hook for recovery/capture.  Finally the Scan Eagle is capable of using multiple advanced sensors and can be controlled both by line-of-sight (LOS) and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) methods ("INSITU: ScanEagle system," 2013)

As for the Risk Assessment Tool (RAT) that I created can be seen below.  It’s basic design was based on what was displayed in our reading.  This form is designed to be accomplished by all crew members involved in the sortie as team prior to flight and be reviewed by the supervisor of flying (SOF).  Starting from the top, each crew member and their assigned position will be filled out.  Next the mission or aircraft commander will go down each row, reading it out loud to the crew to answer and input the corresponding number that’s applicable in the far right column.  Once all rows are complete, the inputted numbers are totaled and then compared to the Risk Level chart at the bottom to determine which category the crew falls into.  Based on their risk level assessment, the corresponding authorization is required in order to continue with the sortie.

This form will improve operations and reduce potential risk by highlighting to the flying crew members and the appropriate authorization level individual to their overall risk level of the sortie in order to determine what if any significant issues are present.  Second at a minimum it will invoke a discussion on any applicable areas and what mitigation techniques can be used to minimize or removed the risk.  Third it will help to determine if the planned sortie shall continue based on the overall risk level.  This last step however can vary depending on the priority of the sortie and the risk in which the crew and the commanders are willing to except. 

As for the issues being questioned on the RAT, both the Preliminary Hazard List/Analysis (PHL/A) and the Operational Hazard Review & Analysis (OHR&A) tools were used and can be seen below.  Although both are not all-in-conclusive in that they only mention some of the issues in which I was able to identify based on the limited knowledge I had on the Scan Eagle system.  In addition, both the PHL/A and the OHR&A only cover the Operational Stage hazards.  Like the Risk Assessment Tool, both of these forms were also based on the reading assignment this week.  Additionally the Probability, Severity, Risk Level and Residual Risk Level were based on the Department of Defense MIL-std-882D/E documentation.  All forms were reproduced and tailored for this assignment.

Reference:

Barnhart, R., Shappee, E., & Marshall, D. (2011).Introduction to unmanned aircraft systems: Chapter 8 - safety assessment. (pp. 123-135). London, GBR: CRC Press, 2011. DOI: ProQuest ebrary, Web 5 May 2015

Department of Defense, Systems Engineering. (2012).DoD standard practice system safety (MIL-STD-882E). Retrieved from Department of Defense website: https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/683694/file/75173/MIL-STD-882E Final 2012-05-11.pdf

INSITU: ScanEagle system. (2013). Retrieved from http://www.insitu.com/systems/scaneagle
Wilke, C. (2007, March 2). Boeing: ScanEagle system overview. Retrieved from http://www.csdy.umn.edu/acgsc/Meeting_99/SubcommitteeE/SEpubrlsSAE.PDF


("DoD standard practice," 2012)

("DoD standard practice," 2012)
("DoD standard practice," 2012)





Tuesday, May 5, 2015

6.7 Research: Automatic Take Off and Laning


The Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk is a high altitude long endurance (HALE) Intelligence Reconnaissance Surveillance (ISR) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was designed as a potential replacement to the manned version; the U-2 Dragon Lady.  The RQ-4 flies at an altitude of approximately 60,000 feet for more than 32 hours at about 340 knots (Quick, 2009).  The newest version block 40 is equipped with a more advanced Multi-Platform Radar Technology insertion Program (MP-RTIP) that permits almost all weather, day or night fully autonomous UAV (Keller, 2012).  The original design of this system was to have it operate completely automated throughout all phases (start, taxi, takeoff, enroute, landing, taxi and shutdown) of its flight via the automation software.  However following its inception into the Air Forces inventory, the ability to manipulate the flight plan was added.  A typical RQ-4 flight consists of two major elements; the Launch Recovery Element (LRE) and the Mission Control Element (MCE) teams ("Rq-4 global hawk," ).  Both of these teams consist of fully trained and qualified RQ-4 pilots that must maintain currencies on annual bases, similar to pilots of manned aircraft.  The purpose of the LRE is to assist during the start, taxi, takeoff and landing phases of flight, while the MCE is in charge of piloting the aircraft ("Rq-4 global hawk," ).  Since the RQ-4 is designed to be completely automated, it does not have the traditional manual mode.  Rather any alterations required to the flight path are accomplished through the computer software controlled by the MCE (Quick, 2009).  During the takeoff and landing phase, the LRE team monitors the flight path and works with the MCE to as needed.  Although the route can be altered in flight, this is not normally practiced as it will alter the sensors targeting priorities.  The landing gear is retracted automatically once passed 400 feet and again extended automatically upon approach.  In the event the aircraft loses link, is unresponsive or becomes a possible hazard, the MCE crew is capable of initiating a self-destruct command.  Once initiated by the flight crew, the system will confirm this command then execute a vertical stall to pancake into the terrain at approximately the same location as it was initiated.  With the inability to manipulated the aircraft by conventional means (sick, pedals and throttles), pilots are limited in their ability to control the aircraft in a timely manner during the critical phases of flight.  This can potentially lead to a safety incident or accident.  This also becomes a bigger factor as the RQ-4 is further integrated within the evolving National Airspace System.  My recommendation is to modify the MCE ground control station and aircraft software to permit a more tactile control. 

In regards to automated takeoff and landing systems on manned aircraft the most common systems available exist on commercial aircraft.  In fact most of the aircraft flying today by the airlines is fully automated.  However for the purpose of this discussion, the Boeing-777 (B-777) automated system will be discussed.  The B-777 is capable of landing in zero feet visibility and zero feet cloud deck height safely while on autopilot; however the minimum altitude in which the aircraft will be flown in bad weather may vary and in most cases is restricted to 200 feet or higher (Lim, 2008).  The success of this system is made possible do the auto pilot software (autopilot and flight director system) combined with additional onboard sensors and global positioning satellites (GPS) that give a constant update to the current location, altitude, airspeed, etc.  Although the landing phase is automated, the pilot is still required to intervene in order to reduce speeds as the flaps are selected (Lim, 2008).  As the aircraft approached the threshold of the runway, the automatic system will transition the aircraft to a landing position (flare), calling out the altitude every 10 feet and finally at 25 feet above the ground will retard the throttles to the aft or min position (Lim, 2008).  Once on the ground and slowing the automated system will initiate the auto brakes combined with the pilot’s use of the reverse thrusters as needed.  This aircraft is also capable of an automated takeoff in which the aircraft will adjust the throttles to optimal limits, rotate the aircraft at the appropriate rotational speed and retract the gear once airborne and clear of the runway environment.  Ultimately pilots are responsible for the constant monitoring of the aircrafts system and instruments and if needed (from system failure, not operating as intended, etc.) the pilot will execute an “auto-pilot disengage switch” then manually fly the aircraft.  Training in using this system is maintained as part of the pilot’s annual proficiency.  In regards to safety, recent studies have shown that the transition from actively flying to monitoring of aircraft systems have caused a deficiency in flying skills.  This is can lead to a dangerous situation during the critical phases of flight ("Routine hands-on procedures," 2014).  In addition, the constant monotony in monitoring of systems has shown to increase the likelihood of pilot fatigue.  A perfect example of this was in the 2013 Asian Airlines accident in which the pilot was unable to hand-fly the B-777 for a landing.  My recommendation is that all pilots are required to fly so many takeoffs and landings per month manually and that all evaluations check-rides are performed manually. 

Reference:
Keller, J. (2012, March 08). Northrop Grumman and Raytheon to demonstrate MP-RTIP radar system on global hawk block 40 UAV. Retrieved from http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2012/03/northrop-grumman-and-raytheon-to-demonstrate-mp-rtip-radar-system-on-global-hawk-block-40-uav.html
Lim. (2008, January 07). Executing a auto landing in a real Boeing 777 as compared to one is a fs 2002.. Retrieved from http://www.askcaptainlim.com/-flight-simulator-pilot-46/636-executing-a-auto-landing-in-a-real-boeing-777-as-compared-to-one-in-a-fs-2002.html
Quick, D. (2009, December 10). Next-gen global hawk hale UAS completes its first flight. Retrieved from http://www.gizmag.com/block-40-global-hawk-flight/13572/
Rq-4 global hawk. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.military.com/equipment/rq-4-global-hawk

Routine hands-on procedures will make flights safer. (2014, January 14). Daily Press. Retrieved from http://articles.dailypress.com/2014-01-14/news/dp-nws-oped-loh-0115-20140114_1_pilot-fatigue-new-pilots-airline-pilots