Sunday, May 24, 2015

9.6 Research: Human Factors, Ethics and Morality

The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in war has multiple advantages most notably with the reduction in causalities for the user.  This advantage was further increased with the added ability to target and engage upon enemy combatants by remote means, further removing the potential for friendly causalities.  However at the same time, this new capability had also changed the face of war creating a “risk-free enterprise” or a sensation as if equal to that of playing a video game (Johansson, 2011).   Currently the military requires by regulations that humans must be involved in the decision making when engaging in lethal force.  However this regulation may change in the future as more advanced artificial intelligence software makes finding, identifying, confirming and even engaging upon “lethal combatants without human intervention possible.  This is what I like to refer to as the Terminator effect.  This once seemed as a far-fetched science fiction movie is now becoming a potential for future warfare, with machines killing discriminately.  But even the current method presents a moral, ethical and unique human factors associated with the use of UAVs as a weapon in conflicts.

Morally we understand that life should only be taken as a last resort as a means of resolving conflict during a state war. Morality however has become more obscured with the use of UAVs, especially when involving lethal force.  This is because the users of UAVs are no longer located in the same area as the targets they are engaged with and therefore are removed from the mental and physical effects normally associated with war in person.   This creates an environment in which the decision for lethal force becomes easy, as those pushing the button are removed from the horror of their action.  This also raises the question, to whether the operators of UAVs are considered lethal combatants of ware given their involvement, despite being removed from the battle field.  The U.S. Department of Defense officials along with most legal scholars agree that operators are legal combatants, whether on or off-duty (Majumdar, 2001).  Of course this presents another factor as most operators are conducting these operations within the borders of the US.  Therefore any retaliation towards the operators from our enemy would be conducted on US soil, creating an unfair advantage for the operator.  However in retaliation, our enemy has broadened their targets beyond the operators.  Just recently “ISIS has been targeting  military personal and even family of military members within the United States, who are involved with UAS” (Majumdar, 2001).  This again poses the question of whether this is morally right or wrong; keeping in mind that the morality is based upon ones cultural acceptance between what is right versus wrong behavior or actions.  In other words, what we consider wrong in our society is morally acceptable by our enemies. 

The more obvious ethical side of using UAVs is in the terms of what is considered legal warfare.  In our history, war was between two or more nations or states; however today, war has been declared and conducted on ideology with no defined state-hood or boarders.  The lake of statehood alone can be considered a violation of the legitimacy of war (Johansson, 2011).  None the less today, we are conducting UAV operations worldwide and even taking lives that we deem necessary under the presumption of war, while finding it illegal for our enemy to do the same against us (Majumdar, 2001).  This raises the question to what is being conducted by means of UAV worldwide morally or ethically right.  Morally we understand when it is acceptable to take a life; however without defining war to the boundaries of statehood, at what point is the political justification that resulted in war truly fulfilled.  Furthermore, at what point are the lines of war blurred as UAV’s transition between boundaries to conduct operations without a declaration of war since no humans are physically on board.  This even extends to those involved in the execution of the UAV; some of which who are civilian agencies.  This even raises the propensity to conduct operations that may result in the loss in life as the perception of war becoming costless (Johansson, 2011). 

UAVs have their own unique human factors associated with their use, which can exacerbate the decision for lethal force.  UAV pilots are first restricted in their ability to use majority of their five senses; currently restricted to only visual (monitors) and audio (radios).   Therefore UAV pilots have higher degree in proportional use of force errors caused by the restriction of their view and the physical separation from the target, resulting in the greater potential for collateral damage to civilian life (Majumdar, 2001).  Other more common human factors that are more likely to occur with UAVs consist of individual skill and knowledge of their weapon system.  This includes checklist errors, task saturation or mis-prioritization, lack in training, and lack in crew coordination. 
          
            The use of  manned aircraft have been accepted as moral and ethical way to wage war given that the declaration of war against a state or nation is clear.  Although accepted, this can still present a problem.  One justification for the continued development and use of UAVs for strikes is that manned aircraft target accuracy can be inhibited by a pilot’s inclination to “hurry when put in a dangerous area or situation” (Johansson, 2011).  However unlike UAVs the perception a manned aircraft pilot has on the target area and well as the target itself is greater.  Manned aircraft pilots have the ability to use majority if not all their five senses to interpret the situation whereas UAV pilots are restricted to visual interpretation from the monitors in front of them and the audio from the radios only. 

Overall, the future use of UAVs needs to have a more definitive declaration of when authorized for use, similar to those of manned aircraft.  Due to the complexity of viable targets, UAV operations need to understand that just because they are not physically present with the aircraft does not remove them from the list of legal combatant.  Therefore, further examination to whether they should be used for lethal strikes should be reviewed as their continued use poses a greater potential threat for homeland defense as retaliation towards the operators and their relatives increase.  Not to mention the moral and ethical implications with their use for striking targets from within the US boarders.  Additionally, more clear guidance needs to be written on what is considered legal warfare in the regards to UAV operations from beyond line of sight.  This is of particular importance as other nations are developing their own UAVs and looking towards the US as to what is considered as an acceptable use.  Therefore we as a nation have the responsibility to define the future morality in the use of UAVs.  This is why I feel that UAVs should be restricted to reconnaissance use only despite having a human making the decision for lethal force.  That manned aircraft are best reserved for physical strikes as they remove some of the ambiguity of information, and decrease the blur between what is morally right and is ethically accepted by majority of the world for use during war.

Reference

Johansson, L. (2011). Is it morally right to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in war?. Philosophy & technology, 24(3), 279-291. doi: 10.1007/s13347-011-0033-8

Majumdar, D. (2001, May 16). Can remote operators of UAVs become military targets?. Defense News, Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/869002825?accountid=27203


Sunday, May 17, 2015

8.6 Research: UAS Crew Member Selection

The specific needs for the operations of the Insitu Scan Eagle and the General Atomics Ikhana are somewhat different.  Currently both of these systems are military platforms that are being operated worldwide by the Army and the Air Force respectively.  With that, the required crew positions, qualification, certification and training that are currently in use can be used as an outline for this new company which will be referred to as Company-X.  Being that these aircraft are operationally different it is important to separate the requirements.  However for the sake of simplicity I will only discuss the flight element and therefore will not include all supporting elements.

First looking at the General Atomica Ikhana, which is a MQ-9 Predator B modified for use in environmental research and observation.  Outside of system modifications, an increased redundancy in flight systems and improvements is performance the functionality remains the same.  The Air Force utilizes a two crewmember concept for their MQ-9 operations; the pilot and sensor operator (this doesn’t include maintenance, or the ground element teams required for takeoff and landings).  Currently they restrict both the pilots and sensor operators to either Rated Officers which consist of both Pilots or Combat System Operators (CSO) or officers who attended the Undergraduate Remotely Piloted Aircraft Training (URT) which is the direct method of training ("Pilot: Remotely piloted," ).  Currently the AF is not permitted enlisted members to act as pilots and sensor operators due to the complexity of the airspace in which the aircraft would be flying in.  For example, pilots will be required to communicate with air traffic controllers, other airborne assets, as well as be able to understand the complexity involved with flying in a dynamic environment.  For this reason, it is wise to assume that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will require drone pilots to hold the same certificates as a commercial and instrument pilot in manned aircraft (Pew, 2013).  Therefore Company-X should also have operators that hold the same aeronautical certificates.  More than likely the best way to insure these aeronautical certificates is to hire pilots, prior MQ-9 pilots or create a training program that fulfills this.  What is interesting to note is that recent studies are indicating that pilots from manned aircraft who transition to remotely operated vehicles tend to perform worst that those who have only flown remote aircraft (Pew, 2013).   The basic belief for this has to do with the limited physical and visual cue a remote pilot has versus those from manned aircraft.  This is known as a negative transfer.  A good program to model after outside of the military is NASA whom also uses the Ikahana variant (Merlin, 2009).   In either case for non-prior pilots, typical training consist of basic flying fundamentals similar to those given to manned aircraft pilots, followed by MQ-9 operations and regulations in simulations and concludes with hands on practical experience with the aircraft itself (Insinna, 2014).   Each pilot and sensor operator will be required to maintain a Second Class medical clearance as outlined by Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 67 (5b).  Other considerations are the minimum requirements that all candidates for pilot/sensor potions should be held to, starting with clean background for security clearance eligibility (as required), a college degree or specific training in remote operations and finally no permanent disqualifications for aviation services.

Ikhana, summarized:
·         Crew Positions: 
     o   Two crewmember concept; pilot and sensor operator for the flight operations.
§  This does not include any ground personal required for maintenance or ground operations prior and after flight.
·         Qualification, certification and training requirements:
     o   Hold a commercial and instrument pilot equivalent rating.
     o   Basic flight training, system operations using simulators, and hands on practical experience      using the MQ-9 aircraft.
     o   Second Class Medial for commercial applications of a UAS
·         Minimum standards for applicants:
     o   Clean background (for potential security clearance)
     o   Bachelor’s degree or training in remote operations
     o   No permanent disqualifications

The second is the Scan Eagle, which is significantly smaller than the MQ-9 and somewhat less advanced in terms of sensors; however the requirements are somewhat the same.  For starters, the Scan Eagle also consist of two “flying” positions; pilot and sensor operator.  Again this does not include any ground elements.  Yet because the Scan Eagle operational range and altitude is less the pilot requirements can be less than the pilots of the MQ-9.  The Army currently does not have a requirement for “rated” officers only; rather they permit an enlisted member assigned to a specific career field.  This however does not mean there is a change to the qualifications.  Although the Scan Eagle pilots do not attend a formalized pilot training course at the manned pilots, they are required to attend an in-depth 33 weeks course (10-weeks of Basic Combat Training; 23-weeks of advanced individual training) followed by on-the-job instruction ("Unmanned aircraft systems," ).  In regards to Company-X, a similar course to that of the Army can benefit the company.  By not requiring the exact same type of training as the MQ-9, Company-X can reduce the cost not only in the training but also in the cost in operations.  Also like the MQ-9, the training requirements will include currency programs to maintain safety as mandated by the FAA (Mirot, 2013).  The FAA regulations also call for pilots/operators to have a minimum of 3 take off and landings per 90 days (Mirot, 2013).  However the Scan Eagle is unique in that the system utilizes a hydraulic launcher and a “sky” net to capture so the typical takeoff and landing are not in the traditional terms.  None the less this does not negate the requirements but instead only modifies the understanding of what takeoff and landings means.  In terms of medical requirements, the Scan Eagle is only requiring a Second Glass medical certificate as outlined by Title 14 of the CFR, Part 67 (Mirot, 2013).  Finally, like the MQ-9, Company-X will need to have applicants who have a clean background for potential security clearances, and again no permanent disqualifications for remote operations.
Scan Eagle, summarized:
·         Crew Positions: 
     o   Two crewmember concept; pilot and sensor operator for the flight operations.
§  This does not include any ground personal required for maintenance or ground operations prior and after flight.
·         Qualification, certification and training requirements:
     o   Basic flight training, system operations using simulators, and hands on practical experience using the Scan Eagle aircraft.
     o   A second class medial certificate for commercial application of a UAS.
·         Minimum standards for applicants:
     o   Clean background (for potential security clearance)
     o   No permanent disqualifications

Reference

Insinna, V. (2014, December). Predator, reaper crew training at all times high as demand continues. National Defense, Retrieved from http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2014/December/Pages/PredatorReaperCrewTrainingatAllTimeHighAsDemandContinues.aspx

 

Merlin, P. (2009). Ikhana unmanned aircraft system western states fire missions. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Retrieved from http://history.nasa.gov/monograph44.pdf
Mirot, A. (2013). The future of unmanned aircraft systems pilot qualification. Journal of aviation/aerospace education & research, 22(3), 19-30. Retrieved from http://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1317&context=jaaer
Pew, G. (2013, April 26). The drones are coming: Who will fly them?. Retrieved from http://www.avweb.com/news/avtraining/drone_pilot_training_forecast_uas_208586-1.html
Pilot: Remotely piloted aircraft pilot. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://afreserve.com/jobs/officer-positions/pilot/remotely-piloted-aircraft-rpa-pilot


Saturday, May 16, 2015

7.7 - Research: Operational Risk Management

My Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment Tool is for the US Army’s Scan Eagle, Unmanned Aerial System (UAS).  It is a single engine, single wing aircraft that is significantly smaller as compared to the USAF’s RQ-1, RQ-9, and RQ-4 at just less than 5.6 feet long with a wingspan of 10.2 feet ("INSITU: ScanEagle system," 2013).  It weighs in at maximum of 48.5 pounds, cruises at 50 to 60 knots that is capable of endurance greater than 24 hours while operating at altitudes up to 19,500 feet ("INSITU: ScanEagle system," 2013).  What’s unique about this system is its launch and recover systems in which it utilizes a catapult for launch and a sky hook for recovery/capture.  Finally the Scan Eagle is capable of using multiple advanced sensors and can be controlled both by line-of-sight (LOS) and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) methods ("INSITU: ScanEagle system," 2013)

As for the Risk Assessment Tool (RAT) that I created can be seen below.  It’s basic design was based on what was displayed in our reading.  This form is designed to be accomplished by all crew members involved in the sortie as team prior to flight and be reviewed by the supervisor of flying (SOF).  Starting from the top, each crew member and their assigned position will be filled out.  Next the mission or aircraft commander will go down each row, reading it out loud to the crew to answer and input the corresponding number that’s applicable in the far right column.  Once all rows are complete, the inputted numbers are totaled and then compared to the Risk Level chart at the bottom to determine which category the crew falls into.  Based on their risk level assessment, the corresponding authorization is required in order to continue with the sortie.

This form will improve operations and reduce potential risk by highlighting to the flying crew members and the appropriate authorization level individual to their overall risk level of the sortie in order to determine what if any significant issues are present.  Second at a minimum it will invoke a discussion on any applicable areas and what mitigation techniques can be used to minimize or removed the risk.  Third it will help to determine if the planned sortie shall continue based on the overall risk level.  This last step however can vary depending on the priority of the sortie and the risk in which the crew and the commanders are willing to except. 

As for the issues being questioned on the RAT, both the Preliminary Hazard List/Analysis (PHL/A) and the Operational Hazard Review & Analysis (OHR&A) tools were used and can be seen below.  Although both are not all-in-conclusive in that they only mention some of the issues in which I was able to identify based on the limited knowledge I had on the Scan Eagle system.  In addition, both the PHL/A and the OHR&A only cover the Operational Stage hazards.  Like the Risk Assessment Tool, both of these forms were also based on the reading assignment this week.  Additionally the Probability, Severity, Risk Level and Residual Risk Level were based on the Department of Defense MIL-std-882D/E documentation.  All forms were reproduced and tailored for this assignment.

Reference:

Barnhart, R., Shappee, E., & Marshall, D. (2011).Introduction to unmanned aircraft systems: Chapter 8 - safety assessment. (pp. 123-135). London, GBR: CRC Press, 2011. DOI: ProQuest ebrary, Web 5 May 2015

Department of Defense, Systems Engineering. (2012).DoD standard practice system safety (MIL-STD-882E). Retrieved from Department of Defense website: https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/683694/file/75173/MIL-STD-882E Final 2012-05-11.pdf

INSITU: ScanEagle system. (2013). Retrieved from http://www.insitu.com/systems/scaneagle
Wilke, C. (2007, March 2). Boeing: ScanEagle system overview. Retrieved from http://www.csdy.umn.edu/acgsc/Meeting_99/SubcommitteeE/SEpubrlsSAE.PDF


("DoD standard practice," 2012)

("DoD standard practice," 2012)
("DoD standard practice," 2012)





Tuesday, May 5, 2015

6.7 Research: Automatic Take Off and Laning


The Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk is a high altitude long endurance (HALE) Intelligence Reconnaissance Surveillance (ISR) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was designed as a potential replacement to the manned version; the U-2 Dragon Lady.  The RQ-4 flies at an altitude of approximately 60,000 feet for more than 32 hours at about 340 knots (Quick, 2009).  The newest version block 40 is equipped with a more advanced Multi-Platform Radar Technology insertion Program (MP-RTIP) that permits almost all weather, day or night fully autonomous UAV (Keller, 2012).  The original design of this system was to have it operate completely automated throughout all phases (start, taxi, takeoff, enroute, landing, taxi and shutdown) of its flight via the automation software.  However following its inception into the Air Forces inventory, the ability to manipulate the flight plan was added.  A typical RQ-4 flight consists of two major elements; the Launch Recovery Element (LRE) and the Mission Control Element (MCE) teams ("Rq-4 global hawk," ).  Both of these teams consist of fully trained and qualified RQ-4 pilots that must maintain currencies on annual bases, similar to pilots of manned aircraft.  The purpose of the LRE is to assist during the start, taxi, takeoff and landing phases of flight, while the MCE is in charge of piloting the aircraft ("Rq-4 global hawk," ).  Since the RQ-4 is designed to be completely automated, it does not have the traditional manual mode.  Rather any alterations required to the flight path are accomplished through the computer software controlled by the MCE (Quick, 2009).  During the takeoff and landing phase, the LRE team monitors the flight path and works with the MCE to as needed.  Although the route can be altered in flight, this is not normally practiced as it will alter the sensors targeting priorities.  The landing gear is retracted automatically once passed 400 feet and again extended automatically upon approach.  In the event the aircraft loses link, is unresponsive or becomes a possible hazard, the MCE crew is capable of initiating a self-destruct command.  Once initiated by the flight crew, the system will confirm this command then execute a vertical stall to pancake into the terrain at approximately the same location as it was initiated.  With the inability to manipulated the aircraft by conventional means (sick, pedals and throttles), pilots are limited in their ability to control the aircraft in a timely manner during the critical phases of flight.  This can potentially lead to a safety incident or accident.  This also becomes a bigger factor as the RQ-4 is further integrated within the evolving National Airspace System.  My recommendation is to modify the MCE ground control station and aircraft software to permit a more tactile control. 

In regards to automated takeoff and landing systems on manned aircraft the most common systems available exist on commercial aircraft.  In fact most of the aircraft flying today by the airlines is fully automated.  However for the purpose of this discussion, the Boeing-777 (B-777) automated system will be discussed.  The B-777 is capable of landing in zero feet visibility and zero feet cloud deck height safely while on autopilot; however the minimum altitude in which the aircraft will be flown in bad weather may vary and in most cases is restricted to 200 feet or higher (Lim, 2008).  The success of this system is made possible do the auto pilot software (autopilot and flight director system) combined with additional onboard sensors and global positioning satellites (GPS) that give a constant update to the current location, altitude, airspeed, etc.  Although the landing phase is automated, the pilot is still required to intervene in order to reduce speeds as the flaps are selected (Lim, 2008).  As the aircraft approached the threshold of the runway, the automatic system will transition the aircraft to a landing position (flare), calling out the altitude every 10 feet and finally at 25 feet above the ground will retard the throttles to the aft or min position (Lim, 2008).  Once on the ground and slowing the automated system will initiate the auto brakes combined with the pilot’s use of the reverse thrusters as needed.  This aircraft is also capable of an automated takeoff in which the aircraft will adjust the throttles to optimal limits, rotate the aircraft at the appropriate rotational speed and retract the gear once airborne and clear of the runway environment.  Ultimately pilots are responsible for the constant monitoring of the aircrafts system and instruments and if needed (from system failure, not operating as intended, etc.) the pilot will execute an “auto-pilot disengage switch” then manually fly the aircraft.  Training in using this system is maintained as part of the pilot’s annual proficiency.  In regards to safety, recent studies have shown that the transition from actively flying to monitoring of aircraft systems have caused a deficiency in flying skills.  This is can lead to a dangerous situation during the critical phases of flight ("Routine hands-on procedures," 2014).  In addition, the constant monotony in monitoring of systems has shown to increase the likelihood of pilot fatigue.  A perfect example of this was in the 2013 Asian Airlines accident in which the pilot was unable to hand-fly the B-777 for a landing.  My recommendation is that all pilots are required to fly so many takeoffs and landings per month manually and that all evaluations check-rides are performed manually. 

Reference:
Keller, J. (2012, March 08). Northrop Grumman and Raytheon to demonstrate MP-RTIP radar system on global hawk block 40 UAV. Retrieved from http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2012/03/northrop-grumman-and-raytheon-to-demonstrate-mp-rtip-radar-system-on-global-hawk-block-40-uav.html
Lim. (2008, January 07). Executing a auto landing in a real Boeing 777 as compared to one is a fs 2002.. Retrieved from http://www.askcaptainlim.com/-flight-simulator-pilot-46/636-executing-a-auto-landing-in-a-real-boeing-777-as-compared-to-one-in-a-fs-2002.html
Quick, D. (2009, December 10). Next-gen global hawk hale UAS completes its first flight. Retrieved from http://www.gizmag.com/block-40-global-hawk-flight/13572/
Rq-4 global hawk. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.military.com/equipment/rq-4-global-hawk

Routine hands-on procedures will make flights safer. (2014, January 14). Daily Press. Retrieved from http://articles.dailypress.com/2014-01-14/news/dp-nws-oped-loh-0115-20140114_1_pilot-fatigue-new-pilots-airline-pilots

Thursday, April 30, 2015

5.6 Research: Shift work Schedule

When first looking at the shift schedule, the cycle between days on verses days off seems adequate; however based on the reports of extreme fatigue and inadequate sleep from the workers tells us that there is something wrong.  This schedule consist of four separate teams working a rotating shift cycle of six days on, two days off and rotating every eight days to the right; morning shift moves to swings, swings to night and night to days etc.  This can be visually seen below in the “Current Shift Schedule” attachment.   After evaluating each of the three shift duration we can see that the Day shift is 8.5 hours (0700 to 1600), Swings is 10.5 hours (1530 to 2400) and Night is 8.5 hours (2330 to 0800).  This means the individual who are assigned the Swing shift work 2 hours longer than the other two shifts.  Furthermore we can see that those working the Day and Night shifts work an average of 51 hours per week while those working the Swings shift work an average of 63 hours per week.  This means that Swings shift works approximately 23.5% more hours per week.

             In order to reduce fatigue, the following schedule is being proposed and is based on personal experience as deployed airmen.  It still consists of four separate teams; however they are now working nine days on, three days off rotating every 12 days; this can be visually seen below in the “Proposed Shift Schedule” attachment.  By having a slower rotational schedule, personal should be able to “adjust their circadian rhythm gradually” to their current shift (Chang, Chen, Wu, Hsu, Liu & Hsu, 2014).  Like the previous schedule, the rotation is to the right; Days to Swings, Swings to Night, Night to Days, etc.  However since there were no foreseeable justification for having one shift longer than the other; this proposal adjusted the shifts to be the same length of 8.5 hours each.  This permits a 30 minute turnover at the beginning of each schedule shift.  Additionally the schedule shift times have been changed in order to more closely follow a natural circadian rhythm cycle.  The new shift hours consist of the following; Days from 0600 to 1430, Swings from 1400 to 2230 and Night from 2200 to 0630; this can be visually seen below in the “New Shift Schedule” attachment. 

            When comparing the current to the proposed schedule there are many pros and cons; however it is important to recognize that there are a lot of unknowns.  For starters, we were not given the flight duration or the number of MQ-1B flown each day.  Additionally we are not given how many personal are working each shift and if they are actually scheduled to fly or perform other duties.  With that being said, the first cons of the current schedule is that it somewhat complies with Air Force Instructions (AFI) 11-202 Volume 3 governing Flight Duty Period.  It states that the “maximum flying time is 56 flight hours per 7 consecutive days, 125 flight hours per 30 consecutive days and 330 flight hours per 90 consecutive days” ("General flight rules," 2014).  In this case looking at the current schedule; only the Day and Night shift would comply with this regulation having only 51 hours per week.  On the other hand, with the new Proposed Shift Schedule each shift will perform a maximum of 56 hours per week.  This does not including the turn over period (since actual flight operations during handoff would not be conducted by off-going crew).  Additionally this regulation is only applicable to actual flight time, not any additional duties before or afterward each shift; that area is govern by AFI 11-202v3 Chapter 2.1 Crew Rest.  This section states that “crew rest is compulsory for aircrew members prior to performing any duties involving aircraft operations and is a minimum of 12 non-duty hours before the Flight Duty Period Begins” (“General flight rules,” 2014).  Outside of the AFI, the only pro is that the work week is shorter by 3 days.  However this can propose a potential issue.  For starters, by having a schedule that is shorter in rotation means that the personal will have a harder time adapting their circadian rhythm to their work hours (Chang, Chen, Wu, Hsu, Liu & Hsu, 2014).  Additionally this may cause “anxiety and a decrease in performance” (Chang, Chen, Wu, Hsu, Liu & Hsu, 2014).  If the current schedule is maintained, studies have shown that there is an increase likelihood that an “accident, error, injury and or fatality” occurring ("Shift work and," )For these reasons is why the Proposed Shift Schedule is longer; it adheres to AFI 11-202v3 and should permit a more stable rotational schedule that allows adaptation by crews.

          In order to maintain a rotational schedule that shifts to the right evenly, the number of days on verses off is 3 to 1 (3 on 1 off; 6 on 2 off; 9 on 3 off; 12 on 4 off etc.).  Another option for reducing stress, sleeping disorders and fatigue is to utilize a fixed schedule and would have been my preferred choice for this exercise given the stability it provides. I have personally experienced both.  In my most recent deployment I was assigned to the night shift (which is one of the three possible shifts; days, nights and mids).  Each shift consisted of one individual per shift working 8 hours a day minimum, but usually does not exceed 12 hours.  This was maintained throughout the duration of the entire deployment (approximately 60 days) with no time off.  This was only permitted because I was not actively flying at the time.  On the contrary, while I was flying, I was assigned to a night shift.  This consisted of nine days on alert standby for combat flight operations (maximum of 12 hours per day; but could not exceed AFI 11-202v3 per week), followed by one day off and then three days mission planning (day time shift) for the other crews before returning back to flying status.  This eventually evolved to seven days flight status (night shift) and seven days mission planning (day shift) with no days off for 120 days.  Each schedules involved moments of fatigue, but were acceptable overall.  Out of the three given, I most preferred the first; every day for 60 days.







Reference

Chang, Y., Chen, H., Wu, Y., Hsu, C., Liu, C., & Hsu, C. (2014). Rotating night shifts too quickly may cause anxiety and decreased attentional performance, and impact prolactin levels during the subsequent day: a case control study. BMC Psychiatry, doi: 10.1186/s12888-014-0218-7
Shift work and sleep. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://sleepfoundation.org/sleep-topics/shift-work-and-sleep

U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Air force. (2014). General flight rules (AFI 11-202 Volume 3). Retrieved from website: http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afi11-202v3/afi11-202v3.pdf





Sunday, April 19, 2015

4.7 Research: UAS Beyond Line of Sight Operations

When most people think of drones, most often they think of the RQ-1 Predator or the armed version MQ-1 and the MQ-9 Reaper.   This is mostly due to the media highlighting their direct impact world-wide during combat operations through armed strikes.  Although both of these systems utilize both Line-of-Sights (LOS) and Beyond-Line-of Sight (BLOS) operations, people often forget about the larger RQ-4 Global Hawk which also has the same capability minus the munitions.   The role of the RQ-4 is “to provide a high-altitude, long-endurance airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance” (ISR) which includes infrared, optical and synthetic aperture radar imagining ("Rq-4b global hawk," 2012).  In addition the RQ-4 is equipped with a theater communications relay system known as BACN (Battlefield Airborne Communications Node).   All of which is very useful as long as there is a link connecting the ground unites to the aircraft.  Unfortunately direct line of sight is not always obtainable; therefore the capability of BLOS was created.  So what is exactly BLOS?  To put it simply; it is the ability to operate and or communicate beyond the physical curvature of the Earth and most manmade or natural obstructions.  So how is this accomplished today? 
At the basic level, the RQ-4’s BLOS operates primarily through Ku band Satellite Communications (SATCOM) system network (Pike).  This typically means that data is being transmitted via a ground control station up to the Satellite then down to the aircraft and back as need using the Ku band frequency range.  For most US military operations the Ku Band falls between 12 to 18 GHz, providing an optimal frequency range for large data transfers ("Satellite frequency bands," ).  As a secondary to the Ku band the RQ-4 Global Hawk is capable of transmit using INMARSAT (Loochkartt, 2014).  INMARSAT operates on a frequency range between 27 and 40 GHz and is currently used by the Department of Defense on what’s known as the Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS) satellite constellation ("Air force distributed," 2009).  This secondary links works in the same fashion as the Ku band Satellite, just with higher-powered and bandwidth ("Air force distributed," 2009).  In most cases aircraft control, collected intelligence data and relayed communication can operate simultaneously.  In some situations, the BLOS includes a LOS link as well.  For example one unit may have a direct LOS link (typically in the Ultra High Frequency range; 300-1000 MHz) with the aircraft, while completing the link using a SATCOM link to a unit that is BLOS or vice versa (Gupta, Ghonge & Jawandhiya, 2013).
Although BLOS provides the capability for pilots and sensor operators to fly and collect data from almost anywhere in the world while at home station, there are many additional elements required to accomplish this beyond the SATCOM network.  For starters, there is a Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) that is deployed with the Global Hawk at its forward operational base.  The LRE are responsible for the loading of the autonomous flight mission plan into the aircraft, and the monitor the aircraft during taxi, take off and landings (Loochkartt, 2014).  While the Mission Control Element (MCE) flies and operates the aircraft sensors from home station (Loochkartt, 2014).  The MCE works directly with the LRE team while the aircraft is on ground using BLOS and LOS for communication between them.  In addition there are the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) that are responsible for the collection, processing, exploitation, analysis and dissemination of ISR data ("Air force distributed," 2009).  These 11 DCGS sites communicate with the MCE element using a combination or both BLOS and LOS depending on their location ("Air force distributed," 2009).  Finally another major element is the Air Operations Center (AOC) that is responsible for the tasking of the Global Hawk asset to provide ISR and theater communications relay ("Rq-4b global hawk," 2012).  Other key players are the individuals who are in charge of maintaining and operating the equipment (aircraft, DCGS, AOC, Satellite Constellation network, GCS, etc.). 
The overall advantage to using a BLOS link is the ability to operate and communicate almost anywhere in the world regardless where the key players are located.  This is because the Ku Band Satellites “provide an overlapping world-wide coverage” Brunnenmeyer, Mills, Patel, Suarez & Kung, 2012).  In addition, the cost in hardware is relatively cheap, and that the smaller beam footprint permits the use of a smaller antenna saving both in weight and in space ("Executive summary of," ).  Finally, BLOS provides both a secure and jam resistant link (Gupta, Ghonge & Jawandhiya, 2013).
The disadvantages for starts are the reduced data transfer rates by using the BLOS.  The Ku band SATCOM is capable of transferring data at nearly 50 Megabits per Second (MPS), but this is significantly slower than LOS link which transfers data at nearly 274 MPS (Pike).  Secondly, the Ku band SATCOM systems are “reaching saturation point on the orbital arc, at which point new systems are served mainly to replace ageing systems” (Brunnenmeyer, Mills, Patel, Suarez & Kung, 2012).  Additionally Ku band systems have performance limitations beyond bandwidth, in they do not provide 100% coverage world-wide.  So in order to maintain BLOS link, “a patchwork of satellites and systems are need to provide continuous coverage such as INMARSAT” (Brunnenmeyer, Mills, Patel, Suarez & Kung, 2012).   When it comes to the Ka band; “not all military users will have access to the WGS system, as this system requires pre-coordination due to the limited number of steerable beams available” (Brunnenmeyer, Mills, Patel, Suarez & Kung, 2012).  Finally, both Ku and Ka bands signals are affected by atmospheric weather conditions; Ka more than Ku ("Executive summary of," ).
A unique human factor issues that is specific to UAS operators that switch from LOS to BLOS begins with the increase in “lack of sensory cues such as ambient visual information, kinesthetic and vestibular inputs and sound” (McCarley & Wickens).  This maybe further amplified by the distance between the operators and the operational environment of the aircraft.  Another factor is the potential impact regarding circadian rhythm and fatigue of an operator in a different time zone may need to change schedules to fulfill mission requirements.  Finally, the impact of system feedback and monitoring cues as the data link band-width is reduced significantly from LOS to BLOS operations. 
As with any military technology, there comes an opportunity for the private sector to incorporate or improve upon it; this has been done before and more than likely will continue.  As for where a UAS with BLOS can be utilized in the private sector there are many.  For starters, “law enforcement, pipeline and power line survey, aerial photography, border patrol, coastal boarders and road traffic surveillance, environmental monitoring, forestry, aerial mapping and meteorology, etc.” (Gupta, Ghonge & Jawandhiya, 2013). All of these examples can use a UAS that has a range that is not limited to the direct LOS, enabling a greater distance covered in a single mission. 


Reference:
(2012). Rq-4b global hawk high-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial system (uas). Air Force Programs, 271-273. Retrieved from http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2012/pdf/af/2012globalhawk.pdf
Air force distributed common ground system. (2009, August 31). Retrieved from http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104525/air-force-distributed-common-ground-system.aspx
Brunnenmeyer, D., Mills, S., Patel, S., Suarez, C., & Kung, L. (2012). Ka and ku operational considerations for military SATCOM applications. Military Communications Conference-Track 4-System Perspectives, 1-7. doi: 10.1109/MILCOM.2012.6415563
Executive summary of the commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) report. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://fas.org/spp/military/docops/navy/commrept/
Gupta, S., Ghonge, M., & Jawandhiya, P. (2013). Review of unmanned aircraft system (uas).International Journal of advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology (IJACRET), 2(4), 1646-1658. Retrieved from http://www.uxvuniversity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Review-of-Unmanned-Aircraft-System-UAS.pdf
Loochkartt, G. (2014, May 02). Rq-4 global hawk maritime demonstration system. Northrop Grumman, 1 6. Retrieved from http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/RQ4Block10GlobalHawk/Documents/GHMD-New-Brochure.pdf
McCarley, J., & Wickens, C. (n.d.). Human factors concerns in uav flight. Institute of Aviation, Aviation Human Factors Division University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1-5. Retrieved from http://www.hf.faa.gov/hfportalnew/Search/DOCs/uavFY04Planrpt.pdf
Pike, J. (n.d.). Rq-4a global hawk (tier ii hae uav). Retrieved from http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/global_hawk.htm
Satellite frequency bands. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.marinesatellitesystems.com/index.php?page_id=101

Wednesday, April 8, 2015

3.6 Research: UAS Integration in the NAS


What are the goals of NextGen, and how does it seek to improve future aviation operations in the NAS (National Airspace System)?

      The overall goals of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) is to improve air transportation by increasing its “capacity and efficiency while improving safety, reducing environmental impacts” and increase user access to the National Airspace System (NAS); (Jones, 2014).  In order to achieve this goal, the (Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will implement new navigation rounds and procedures using state of the art technology and aircraft navigation capacities (Jones, 2014).

      So what is NextGen exactly; the 2013 Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System Roadmap defines NextGen as “a series of inter-linked programs, systems and policies that implement advanced technologies and capabilities to dramatically change the way the current aviation system is operated.  NextGen is a satellite-based and relies on a network to share information and digital communications so all users of the system are aware of the users’ precise locations.”

How do UAS fit into this vision for the future keeping in mind the research you have done on Detect, Sense and Avoid requirements, and Lost Link scenarios?

      In 2013, the FAA had published a roadmap in which it outlined what was needed in order to facilitate the increasing demand of UAS into the NAS.  This plan goes into details outlining “the tasks, assumptions, dependencies and considerations needed to enable UAS integration in the NAS within the wider UAS community.” (Foxx, 2013).

     In regards to the Detect, Sense and Avoid requirements, the roadmap stated that “Unmanned flight will require new or revised operational rules to regulate the use of Sense and Avoid (SAA) systems as an alternate method to comply with “see and avoid” operational rules currently required of manned aircraft” (Huerta, 2013).   Two methods for meeting the SAA requirements include both a Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) and Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA); (Huerta, 2013).

     In regards to Lost Link the main goal for “Control and Communications (C2) is the development of a link between the unmanned aircraft and the control station to support the required performance of the unmanned aircraft in the NAS and to ensure that the pilot always maintains a threshold level of control of the aircraft” (Huerta, 2013).  However the UAS roadmap had identified that further research is still needed in order to find an adequate backup system or method in the event the command link is lost via equipment malfunction or of intentional means.

     Other areas of focus for the integration of UAS in the NAS include Certification Requirements (Airworthiness), Certification Requirements (Pilot/Crew), Small UAS and other Rules, Test Ranges and Air Traffic Interoperability (Foxx, 2013).

     Unfortunately, just over a year ago in 2014, a Hearing lead by subcommittee Chairman Frank LoBiondo (Republican of New Jersey) was conducted on the progress the FAA was on concerning NextGen.  During this hearing, many problems were identified to include those associated in the integrating of unmanned aircraft in the NAS in which the FAA has mentioned that they “will not be able to meet Congress’ September 2015 deadline for safety integrating unmanned aircraft into the airspace system and has not committed to an alternative implementation timeline.” (Tennyson, 2014). 

What human factors issues or challenges do you foresee with the implementation of NextGen and the integration of UAS?

     The UAS in the NAS roadmap outlines potential human factor issues and challenges.  The most obvious issue is that the existing standards for safe operations are designed for pilots who actually fly on board the aircraft (Huerta, 2013).  However other potential impacts for safe operations in the NAS include the following:
  •         “The UAS pilot is not onboard the aircraft and does not have the same sensory and environmental cue as a manned aircraft pilot” (Huerta, 2013).
  •          “The UAS pilot does not have the ability to directly comply with see-and-avoid responsibilities and UAS SAA systems do not meet current operational rules” (Huerta, 2013).
  •          “The UAS pilot must depend on a data link for control of the aircraft.  The affects the aircraft’s response to revised ATC clearances, other ATC instructions, or unplanned contingencies” (Huerta, 2013).
  •          “UAS cannot comply with certain air traffic control clearances, and alternate means may need to be considered” (Huerta, 2013).
  •          “UAS present air traffic controllers with a different range of platform sizes and operational capabilities (such as size, speed altitude, wake turbulence criteria, and combinations thereof)” (Huerta, 2013).
  •          “Some UAS launch and recovery methods differ from manned aircraft and require manual placement and removal from runways, a lead vehicle for taxi operations, or dedicated launch and recovery systems” (Huerta, 2013).
  •          UAS expected range of performance may vary significantly from the performance characteristics of manned aircraft due to the varying in size, speed and other flight capabilities (Huerta, 2013).

Reference

Foxx, A. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. (2013). Unmanned aircraft systems comprehensive plan. Retrieved from website: https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/UAS_Comprehensive_Plan.pdf

Huerta, M. US Department of transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. (2013). Integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace system roadmap. Retrieved from website: http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf

Jones, T. (2014, October 13). Fact sheet: Nextgen and performance based navigation. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=10856

Tennyson, E. (2014, February 06). Hearing reveals faa behind on nextgen, uas, consolidation. AOPA: All News, Retrieved from http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2014/February/06/FAA-behind-on-NextGen-UAS-and-consolidation-hearing-reveals.aspx