5.6 Research: Shift work Schedule

When first looking at the shift schedule, the cycle between days on verses days off seems adequate; however based on the reports of extreme fatigue and inadequate sleep from the workers tells us that there is something wrong.  This schedule consist of four separate teams working a rotating shift cycle of six days on, two days off and rotating every eight days to the right; morning shift moves to swings, swings to night and night to days etc.  This can be visually seen below in the “Current Shift Schedule” attachment.   After evaluating each of the three shift duration we can see that the Day shift is 8.5 hours (0700 to 1600), Swings is 10.5 hours (1530 to 2400) and Night is 8.5 hours (2330 to 0800).  This means the individual who are assigned the Swing shift work 2 hours longer than the other two shifts.  Furthermore we can see that those working the Day and Night shifts work an average of 51 hours per week while those working the Swings shift work an average of 63 hours per week.  This means that Swings shift works approximately 23.5% more hours per week.

             In order to reduce fatigue, the following schedule is being proposed and is based on personal experience as deployed airmen.  It still consists of four separate teams; however they are now working nine days on, three days off rotating every 12 days; this can be visually seen below in the “Proposed Shift Schedule” attachment.  By having a slower rotational schedule, personal should be able to “adjust their circadian rhythm gradually” to their current shift (Chang, Chen, Wu, Hsu, Liu & Hsu, 2014).  Like the previous schedule, the rotation is to the right; Days to Swings, Swings to Night, Night to Days, etc.  However since there were no foreseeable justification for having one shift longer than the other; this proposal adjusted the shifts to be the same length of 8.5 hours each.  This permits a 30 minute turnover at the beginning of each schedule shift.  Additionally the schedule shift times have been changed in order to more closely follow a natural circadian rhythm cycle.  The new shift hours consist of the following; Days from 0600 to 1430, Swings from 1400 to 2230 and Night from 2200 to 0630; this can be visually seen below in the “New Shift Schedule” attachment. 

            When comparing the current to the proposed schedule there are many pros and cons; however it is important to recognize that there are a lot of unknowns.  For starters, we were not given the flight duration or the number of MQ-1B flown each day.  Additionally we are not given how many personal are working each shift and if they are actually scheduled to fly or perform other duties.  With that being said, the first cons of the current schedule is that it somewhat complies with Air Force Instructions (AFI) 11-202 Volume 3 governing Flight Duty Period.  It states that the “maximum flying time is 56 flight hours per 7 consecutive days, 125 flight hours per 30 consecutive days and 330 flight hours per 90 consecutive days” ("General flight rules," 2014).  In this case looking at the current schedule; only the Day and Night shift would comply with this regulation having only 51 hours per week.  On the other hand, with the new Proposed Shift Schedule each shift will perform a maximum of 56 hours per week.  This does not including the turn over period (since actual flight operations during handoff would not be conducted by off-going crew).  Additionally this regulation is only applicable to actual flight time, not any additional duties before or afterward each shift; that area is govern by AFI 11-202v3 Chapter 2.1 Crew Rest.  This section states that “crew rest is compulsory for aircrew members prior to performing any duties involving aircraft operations and is a minimum of 12 non-duty hours before the Flight Duty Period Begins” (“General flight rules,” 2014).  Outside of the AFI, the only pro is that the work week is shorter by 3 days.  However this can propose a potential issue.  For starters, by having a schedule that is shorter in rotation means that the personal will have a harder time adapting their circadian rhythm to their work hours (Chang, Chen, Wu, Hsu, Liu & Hsu, 2014).  Additionally this may cause “anxiety and a decrease in performance” (Chang, Chen, Wu, Hsu, Liu & Hsu, 2014).  If the current schedule is maintained, studies have shown that there is an increase likelihood that an “accident, error, injury and or fatality” occurring ("Shift work and," ).  For these reasons is why the Proposed Shift Schedule is longer; it adheres to AFI 11-202v3 and should permit a more stable rotational schedule that allows adaptation by crews.

          In order to maintain a rotational schedule that shifts to the right evenly, the number of days on verses off is 3 to 1 (3 on 1 off; 6 on 2 off; 9 on 3 off; 12 on 4 off etc.).  Another option for reducing stress, sleeping disorders and fatigue is to utilize a fixed schedule and would have been my preferred choice for this exercise given the stability it provides. I have personally experienced both.  In my most recent deployment I was assigned to the night shift (which is one of the three possible shifts; days, nights and mids).  Each shift consisted of one individual per shift working 8 hours a day minimum, but usually does not exceed 12 hours.  This was maintained throughout the duration of the entire deployment (approximately 60 days) with no time off.  This was only permitted because I was not actively flying at the time.  On the contrary, while I was flying, I was assigned to a night shift.  This consisted of nine days on alert standby for combat flight operations (maximum of 12 hours per day; but could not exceed AFI 11-202v3 per week), followed by one day off and then three days mission planning (day time shift) for the other crews before returning back to flying status.  This eventually evolved to seven days flight status (night shift) and seven days mission planning (day shift) with no days off for 120 days.  Each schedules involved moments of fatigue, but were acceptable overall.  Out of the three given, I most preferred the first; every day for 60 days.

Reference

Chang, Y., Chen, H., Wu, Y., Hsu, C., Liu, C., & Hsu, C. (2014). Rotating night shifts too quickly may cause anxiety and decreased attentional performance, and impact prolactin levels during the subsequent day: a case control study. BMC Psychiatry, doi: 10.1186/s12888-014-0218-7

Shift work and sleep. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://sleepfoundation.org/sleep-topics/shift-work-and-sleep

U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Air force. (2014). General flight rules (AFI 11-202 Volume 3). Retrieved from website: http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afi11-202v3/afi11-202v3.pdf

4.7 Research: UAS Beyond Line of Sight Operations

When most people think of drones, most often they think of the RQ-1 Predator or the armed version MQ-1 and the MQ-9 Reaper.   This is mostly due to the media highlighting their direct impact world-wide during combat operations through armed strikes.  Although both of these systems utilize both Line-of-Sights (LOS) and Beyond-Line-of Sight (BLOS) operations, people often forget about the larger RQ-4 Global Hawk which also has the same capability minus the munitions.   The role of the RQ-4 is “to provide a high-altitude, long-endurance airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance” (ISR) which includes infrared, optical and synthetic aperture radar imagining ("Rq-4b global hawk," 2012).  In addition the RQ-4 is equipped with a theater communications relay system known as BACN (Battlefield Airborne Communications Node).   All of which is very useful as long as there is a link connecting the ground unites to the aircraft.  Unfortunately direct line of sight is not always obtainable; therefore the capability of BLOS was created.  So what is exactly BLOS?  To put it simply; it is the ability to operate and or communicate beyond the physical curvature of the Earth and most manmade or natural obstructions.  So how is this accomplished today? 

At the basic level, the RQ-4’s BLOS operates primarily through Ku band Satellite Communications (SATCOM) system network (Pike).  This typically means that data is being transmitted via a ground control station up to the Satellite then down to the aircraft and back as need using the Ku band frequency range.  For most US military operations the Ku Band falls between 12 to 18 GHz, providing an optimal frequency range for large data transfers ("Satellite frequency bands," ).  As a secondary to the Ku band the RQ-4 Global Hawk is capable of transmit using INMARSAT (Loochkartt, 2014).  INMARSAT operates on a frequency range between 27 and 40 GHz and is currently used by the Department of Defense on what’s known as the Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS) satellite constellation ("Air force distributed," 2009).  This secondary links works in the same fashion as the Ku band Satellite, just with higher-powered and bandwidth ("Air force distributed," 2009).  In most cases aircraft control, collected intelligence data and relayed communication can operate simultaneously.  In some situations, the BLOS includes a LOS link as well.  For example one unit may have a direct LOS link (typically in the Ultra High Frequency range; 300-1000 MHz) with the aircraft, while completing the link using a SATCOM link to a unit that is BLOS or vice versa (Gupta, Ghonge & Jawandhiya, 2013).

Although BLOS provides the capability for pilots and sensor operators to fly and collect data from almost anywhere in the world while at home station, there are many additional elements required to accomplish this beyond the SATCOM network.  For starters, there is a Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) that is deployed with the Global Hawk at its forward operational base.  The LRE are responsible for the loading of the autonomous flight mission plan into the aircraft, and the monitor the aircraft during taxi, take off and landings (Loochkartt, 2014).  While the Mission Control Element (MCE) flies and operates the aircraft sensors from home station (Loochkartt, 2014).  The MCE works directly with the LRE team while the aircraft is on ground using BLOS and LOS for communication between them.  In addition there are the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) that are responsible for the collection, processing, exploitation, analysis and dissemination of ISR data ("Air force distributed," 2009).  These 11 DCGS sites communicate with the MCE element using a combination or both BLOS and LOS depending on their location ("Air force distributed," 2009).  Finally another major element is the Air Operations Center (AOC) that is responsible for the tasking of the Global Hawk asset to provide ISR and theater communications relay ("Rq-4b global hawk," 2012).  Other key players are the individuals who are in charge of maintaining and operating the equipment (aircraft, DCGS, AOC, Satellite Constellation network, GCS, etc.). 

The overall advantage to using a BLOS link is the ability to operate and communicate almost anywhere in the world regardless where the key players are located.  This is because the Ku Band Satellites “provide an overlapping world-wide coverage” Brunnenmeyer, Mills, Patel, Suarez & Kung, 2012).  In addition, the cost in hardware is relatively cheap, and that the smaller beam footprint permits the use of a smaller antenna saving both in weight and in space ("Executive summary of," ).  Finally, BLOS provides both a secure and jam resistant link (Gupta, Ghonge & Jawandhiya, 2013).

The disadvantages for starts are the reduced data transfer rates by using the BLOS.  The Ku band SATCOM is capable of transferring data at nearly 50 Megabits per Second (MPS), but this is significantly slower than LOS link which transfers data at nearly 274 MPS (Pike).  Secondly, the Ku band SATCOM systems are “reaching saturation point on the orbital arc, at which point new systems are served mainly to replace ageing systems” (Brunnenmeyer, Mills, Patel, Suarez & Kung, 2012).  Additionally Ku band systems have performance limitations beyond bandwidth, in they do not provide 100% coverage world-wide.  So in order to maintain BLOS link, “a patchwork of satellites and systems are need to provide continuous coverage such as INMARSAT” (Brunnenmeyer, Mills, Patel, Suarez & Kung, 2012).   When it comes to the Ka band; “not all military users will have access to the WGS system, as this system requires pre-coordination due to the limited number of steerable beams available” (Brunnenmeyer, Mills, Patel, Suarez & Kung, 2012).  Finally, both Ku and Ka bands signals are affected by atmospheric weather conditions; Ka more than Ku ("Executive summary of," ).

A unique human factor issues that is specific to UAS operators that switch from LOS to BLOS begins with the increase in “lack of sensory cues such as ambient visual information, kinesthetic and vestibular inputs and sound” (McCarley & Wickens).  This maybe further amplified by the distance between the operators and the operational environment of the aircraft.  Another factor is the potential impact regarding circadian rhythm and fatigue of an operator in a different time zone may need to change schedules to fulfill mission requirements.  Finally, the impact of system feedback and monitoring cues as the data link band-width is reduced significantly from LOS to BLOS operations. 

As with any military technology, there comes an opportunity for the private sector to incorporate or improve upon it; this has been done before and more than likely will continue.  As for where a UAS with BLOS can be utilized in the private sector there are many.  For starters, “law enforcement, pipeline and power line survey, aerial photography, border patrol, coastal boarders and road traffic surveillance, environmental monitoring, forestry, aerial mapping and meteorology, etc.” (Gupta, Ghonge & Jawandhiya, 2013). All of these examples can use a UAS that has a range that is not limited to the direct LOS, enabling a greater distance covered in a single mission. 

Reference:

(2012). Rq-4b global hawk high-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial system (uas). Air Force Programs, 271-273. Retrieved from http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2012/pdf/af/2012globalhawk.pdf

Air force distributed common ground system. (2009, August 31). Retrieved from http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104525/air-force-distributed-common-ground-system.aspx

Brunnenmeyer, D., Mills, S., Patel, S., Suarez, C., & Kung, L. (2012). Ka and ku operational considerations for military SATCOM applications. Military Communications Conference-Track 4-System Perspectives, 1-7. doi: 10.1109/MILCOM.2012.6415563

Executive summary of the commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) report. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://fas.org/spp/military/docops/navy/commrept/

Gupta, S., Ghonge, M., & Jawandhiya, P. (2013). Review of unmanned aircraft system (uas).International Journal of advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology (IJACRET), 2(4), 1646-1658. Retrieved from http://www.uxvuniversity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Review-of-Unmanned-Aircraft-System-UAS.pdf

Loochkartt, G. (2014, May 02). Rq-4 global hawk maritime demonstration system. Northrop Grumman, 1 6. Retrieved from http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/RQ4Block10GlobalHawk/Documents/GHMD-New-Brochure.pdf

McCarley, J., & Wickens, C. (n.d.). Human factors concerns in uav flight. Institute of Aviation, Aviation Human Factors Division University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1-5. Retrieved from http://www.hf.faa.gov/hfportalnew/Search/DOCs/uavFY04Planrpt.pdf

Pike, J. (n.d.). Rq-4a global hawk (tier ii hae uav). Retrieved from http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/global_hawk.htm

Satellite frequency bands. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.marinesatellitesystems.com/index.php?page_id=101

3.6 Research: UAS Integration in the NAS

What are the goals of NextGen, and how does it seek to improve future aviation operations in the NAS (National Airspace System)?

      The overall goals of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) is to improve air transportation by increasing its “capacity and efficiency while improving safety, reducing environmental impacts” and increase user access to the National Airspace System (NAS); (Jones, 2014).  In order to achieve this goal, the (Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will implement new navigation rounds and procedures using state of the art technology and aircraft navigation capacities (Jones, 2014).

      So what is NextGen exactly; the 2013 Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System Roadmap defines NextGen as “a series of inter-linked programs, systems and policies that implement advanced technologies and capabilities to dramatically change the way the current aviation system is operated.  NextGen is a satellite-based and relies on a network to share information and digital communications so all users of the system are aware of the users’ precise locations.”

How do UAS fit into this vision for the future keeping in mind the research you have done on Detect, Sense and Avoid requirements, and Lost Link scenarios?

      In 2013, the FAA had published a roadmap in which it outlined what was needed in order to facilitate the increasing demand of UAS into the NAS.  This plan goes into details outlining “the tasks, assumptions, dependencies and considerations needed to enable UAS integration in the NAS within the wider UAS community.” (Foxx, 2013).

     In regards to the Detect, Sense and Avoid requirements, the roadmap stated that “Unmanned flight will require new or revised operational rules to regulate the use of Sense and Avoid (SAA) systems as an alternate method to comply with “see and avoid” operational rules currently required of manned aircraft” (Huerta, 2013).   Two methods for meeting the SAA requirements include both a Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) and Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA); (Huerta, 2013).

     In regards to Lost Link the main goal for “Control and Communications (C2) is the development of a link between the unmanned aircraft and the control station to support the required performance of the unmanned aircraft in the NAS and to ensure that the pilot always maintains a threshold level of control of the aircraft” (Huerta, 2013).  However the UAS roadmap had identified that further research is still needed in order to find an adequate backup system or method in the event the command link is lost via equipment malfunction or of intentional means.

     Other areas of focus for the integration of UAS in the NAS include Certification Requirements (Airworthiness), Certification Requirements (Pilot/Crew), Small UAS and other Rules, Test Ranges and Air Traffic Interoperability (Foxx, 2013).

     Unfortunately, just over a year ago in 2014, a Hearing lead by subcommittee Chairman Frank LoBiondo (Republican of New Jersey) was conducted on the progress the FAA was on concerning NextGen.  During this hearing, many problems were identified to include those associated in the integrating of unmanned aircraft in the NAS in which the FAA has mentioned that they “will not be able to meet Congress’ September 2015 deadline for safety integrating unmanned aircraft into the airspace system and has not committed to an alternative implementation timeline.” (Tennyson, 2014). 

What human factors issues or challenges do you foresee with the implementation of NextGen and the integration of UAS?

     The UAS in the NAS roadmap outlines potential human factor issues and challenges.  The most obvious issue is that the existing standards for safe operations are designed for pilots who actually fly on board the aircraft (Huerta, 2013).  However other potential impacts for safe operations in the NAS include the following:

•         “The UAS pilot is not onboard the aircraft and does not have the same sensory and environmental cue as a manned aircraft pilot” (Huerta, 2013).
•          “The UAS pilot does not have the ability to directly comply with see-and-avoid responsibilities and UAS SAA systems do not meet current operational rules” (Huerta, 2013).
•          “The UAS pilot must depend on a data link for control of the aircraft.  The affects the aircraft’s response to revised ATC clearances, other ATC instructions, or unplanned contingencies” (Huerta, 2013).
•          “UAS cannot comply with certain air traffic control clearances, and alternate means may need to be considered” (Huerta, 2013).
•          “UAS present air traffic controllers with a different range of platform sizes and operational capabilities (such as size, speed altitude, wake turbulence criteria, and combinations thereof)” (Huerta, 2013).
•          “Some UAS launch and recovery methods differ from manned aircraft and require manual placement and removal from runways, a lead vehicle for taxi operations, or dedicated launch and recovery systems” (Huerta, 2013).
•          UAS expected range of performance may vary significantly from the performance characteristics of manned aircraft due to the varying in size, speed and other flight capabilities (Huerta, 2013).

Reference

Foxx, A. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. (2013). Unmanned aircraft systems comprehensive plan. Retrieved from website: https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/UAS_Comprehensive_Plan.pdf

Huerta, M. US Department of transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. (2013). Integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace system roadmap. Retrieved from website: http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf

Jones, T. (2014, October 13). Fact sheet: Nextgen and performance based navigation. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=10856

Tennyson, E. (2014, February 06). Hearing reveals faa behind on nextgen, uas, consolidation. AOPA: All News, Retrieved from http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2014/February/06/FAA-behind-on-NextGen-UAS-and-consolidation-hearing-reveals.aspx

2.7 Case Analysis: Abstract Submission

Abstract

With the increase in demand for reconnaissance aircraft over the last two decades, the debate of using manned verses unmanned aircraft is often argued.  Strictly focusing on the human factors element and not the sensors on-board or available, most would argue that Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) is the best way.  However the human element is still required in the operation of UAV and therefore is subject to the same human factors as those in manned aircraft.  This purpose of this paper is to identify the human factors associated with the United States Air Force (USAF) Global Hawk and compare them to those of the manned version better known as the U-2 Dragon Lady.  This paper will include at a minimum an analysis of the types of operations each aircraft are used for including the flight profiles flown, the layout of the Global Hawks Ground Control System (GCS) versus the cockpit of the U-2, and any of the known human factors associated with the Global Hawk to those of the U-2 with the focus being on operator fatigue and ergonomics.  Additionally this paper will propose potential mitigation techniques to either eliminate or minimize the respective human factors discovered throughout the research.  This will also include those solutions in which the USAF is proposing in order to mitigate or eliminate.  Finally this paper will conclude with any recommendations discovered throughout the paper.  

2.6 Research: UAS GCS Human Factors Issue

Analysis of a Common UAV Ground Control Station

Robert N. Short II

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University – Worldwide

In Partial Fulfillment of MAS

April 5, 2015

     The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for military operations is nothing new.  As early as World War One, the development and use of UAVs for use in combat was seen, however they lacked the capabilities and sophistication of the ones in use today.  It wasn’t until the millennium that we begin to see and exponential growth in both the development and use of UAVs in combat due to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.  This has also changed from being primarily a single service (United States Air Force) that used a traditional size aircraft equivalent to manned aircraft, to each service branch having their own unique type (surveillance or tactical weapons employment) and size (micro to full size).   In our readings this week we were introduced the multiple types of UAV ground control stations (GCS) available to operate these UAVs.  However each of these GCS varied greatly in size, function and equipment.  This also meant that each had a different way in which they were controlled and the amount of training required to operate them.  For this very reason, military leaders started inquiring in 2011 for the development of a single or “common UAV GCS” that each service can use regardless of the type of UAV being flown in order to “save money in training and development cost” (McHale, 2010).  The main functionality of this common system is that it would employ “open systems architecture”; simply meaning that it can be modified quickly by use of “software modules” that are specific to each UAV system, “independent from the hardware” (McHale, 2010).  These article theories with the concept that one type of user can use the system one moment and then when completed, another different type of user can then use the same system following a quick equipment swap out.  In addition to the open architecture, the new GCS designed is also expected to have a more advanced cockpit design.   For example, this new type would permit an increase in situational awareness by means of a high-definition display that would allow a pilot to have a “120 degree field of view” (McHale, 2010). 

     However this may not work for all types of UAVs.  For example, large surveillance aircraft such as the USAF Global Hawk may operate on 24 hours bases and therefore may require a more flexible time schedule in regards to GCS operating time.  Furthermore, the Global Hawk system for the most part is a preprogramed based system (static navigation flight plan), which is monitored throughout the mission and may only need inputs during the critical phases of flight (landing and takeoffs).  Therefore a single GCS would not function well in this type of environment if its purpose is for use by multiple UAVs during a given operation. 

     The most likely human factors issues that may result from the use of a “common GCS” system like this would be in the form of fatigue and ergonomics.  The fatigue element can be a result of multiple factors.  The likely for fatigue can simply occur from the prolong flight duration and continuous monitoring of sensor and flight information.  Unfortunately this is one area that is not easily “fixed”.  Rather the military has discovered that one of the best way to mitigate fatigue in regards to long duration UAVs is to first utilize a crew operation; one being the pilot and the other being a system operator and may include a second crew for excessively long direction flights.  The second one, requiring the same regulations governing manned flight in regards to flight duty day period as outlined in the Air Force Instruction 11-202V3.  Another possible way to further mitigate fatigue is how the displays are situated along with combining as much information in as few screens as possible in order to reduce the amount of head movements and scanning of systems.  This of course is directly related to the issues of ergonomics which will be discussed in more detail later on.  Addressing the fatigue element further through ergonomics there are many solutions.  First off developers need to carefully consider how information is laid out on the screen as well as to which colors to use.  For the most part there are already standards in regards to color and layout.  For example, green indicates normal or safe operation, yellow would indicate caution or advisory and red would indicate warning.  Additionally they must maintain the standardized layout of all basic displays such as the Attitude Director Indicator (ADI), Horizontal Situation Indicator (HIS), Altimeter, and Airspeed Indicator.  These are the primary displays in which all pilots would expect to see in any aircraft and have been trained to read in a particular way.  In other words, a pilot would expect to see an ADI that shows the ground as either black or brown and the sky as either blue or white.  In addition, the ADI would have a set spacing in degrees for turn and climb indications.  Another possible solution is the use of tactile interface in order to alert pilots and sensor operators to important information.  Report findings indicated that tactile interface combined with the visual indicators can improve overall performance even if the operator was not actively monitoring the system (Cooke, Pringle & Pedersen, 2006). 

     Expanding further on ergonomics solutions, it is imperative that the GCS designers need to consider module placement in regards to pilot and sensor operator position.  Even with the use of removable modules the design of this nature can be complicated due to the complexity of having multiple UAVs that use the same basic GCS layout.  The first part towards a solution is identifying the number of personal required to operator the particular UAV.  Next, the type of equipment required to operate it.  The last major step is an in-depth analysis of operator and equipment interaction.  With today’s technology, this last step can be computer simulated through the use of ergonomics layout assessment in a virtual design of cockpit or GCS (Lijing, Wei, Xueli, Xiaohui, Jinhai, Lin & Gaoyong, 2009).  The key to reducing ergonomics issues is taken from historical data of aircraft and systems design, feedback from users and testing. 

References

Cooke, N., Pringle, H., & Pedersen, H. (2006). Human factors of remotely operated vehicles. (Vol. 7, pp. 149-162). New York: JAI Press. Retrieved from     http://site.ebrary.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/lib/erau/reader.action?docID=10139446&ppg=4

Lijing, W., Wei, X., Xueli, H., Xiaohui, S., Jinhai, Y., Lin, Z., & Gaoyong, S. (2009). The virtual evaluation of the ergonomics layout in aircraft. Computer-Aided Industrial design & conceptual Design, 1438-1442. doi: 10.1109/CAIDCD.2009.5375353

McHale, J. (2010). Common uav ground control station for multiple UAV programs in the work. Intelligent aerospace, Retrieved from http://www.intelligent-aerospace.com/articles/2010/08/common-uav-ground.html